Quantum signature scheme with single photons by Wang, Jian et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
11
22
4v
1 
 2
3 
N
ov
 2
00
5
Quantum signature scheme with single photons
Wang Jian∗ Zhang Quan Tang Chao-jing
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
De Ya Road, Changsha, Hunan 410073, China
February 19, 2011
Abstract
Quantum digital signature combines quantum theory with classical digital signature. The main
goal of this field is to take advantage of quantum effects to provide unconditionally secure signature.
We present a quantum signature scheme with message recovery without using entangle effect. The
most important property of the proposed scheme is that it is not necessary for the scheme to use
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states. The present scheme utilizes single photons to achieve the aim
of signature and verification. The security of the scheme relies on the quantum one-time pad and
quantum key distribution. The efficiency analysis shows that the proposed scheme is an efficient
scheme.
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1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography is a cryptographic system using quantum effects to provide unconditionally se-
cure information exchange. Many advances have been made in quantum cryptography in recent years,
including quantum key distribution (QKD)[3, 4, 5], quantum secret sharing[6], quantum authentication
and quantum signature[1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Classical digital signature is the basis of realizing identity au-
thentication, data integrity protection and non-repudiation services. Because classical digital signature is
not unconditionally secure, some quantum signature schemes are proposed in recent years[1, 2, 8, 9, 10].
Quantum digital signature combines quantum theory with classical digital signature and utilizes quantum
effects to achieve unconditional security.
Gottesman and Chuang proposed a quantum signature scheme based on quantum one-way functions
and quantum Swap-test[8]. However, their scheme is an inefficient scheme. Zeng and Christoph proposed
an arbitrated quantum signature scheme whose security based on the correlation of the Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) triplet states and the use of quantum one-time pad[1]. Lee et al. proposed two
quantum signature schemes with message recovery[2]. Lee’s schemes also use GHZ triplet states, qubit
operations and quantum one-time pad to generate and verify the signature. Lu¨ and Feng presented two
quantum signature schemes, one scheme based on quantum one-way functions and the other based on
GHZ triplet states and quantum stabilizer codes[9, 10].
Most of the proposed quantum signature schemes use entangle effect to achieve the aim of signature
and verification. In this paper, we present a quantum signature scheme with message recovery without
using entangle effect. The communication parties utilize single photons to perform signature and verifi-
cation with the help of an arbitrator. The security of our scheme relies on quantum one-time pad and
quantum key distribution proved as unconditionally secure[11, 12]. Because our scheme does not need
to distribute the GHZ particles and only needs von Neumann measurement, our scheme provides higher
efficiency.
∗jwang@nudt.edu.cn
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2 Description of our quantum signature scheme
Our scheme is composed of three parts: initial phase, signature phase and verification phase, involving
three participators, the signatory Alice, the receiver Bob and the arbitrator. In the initial phase, the
arbitrator distributes secret information to each Alice and Bob. In the signature phase, Alice generates
her signature in association with the message qubits, the secret information and qubit operations. In the
verification phase, Bob verifies Alice’s signature with the help of the arbitrator.
Both QKD and quantum one-time pad play important roles in our scheme. We use QKD protocol,
such as BB84 or B92 protocol to distribute the secret information. The encryption algorithm used in
our scheme is quantum one-time pad described in [13]. We select a set of M unitary operations {Uk},
k = 1, · · · ,M . The key k is chosen with probability pk and the message state is ρ. Then we obtain the
cipher state ρc, where ρc =
∑
k
pkUkρU
†
k
= 1
2n
I.
2.1 Initial Phase
Alice and Bob share secret keys Ka, Kb with the arbitrator, respectively. These keys are assumed to be
distributed via QKD protocol. The arbitrator generates two random secret bit strings A and B, where
A = {A1, A2, · · · , An}, B = {B1, B2, · · · , Bn}, Ai, Bi(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) ∈ {0, 1}, as authentication keys and
distributes the two strings to each Alice and Bob via QKD protocol.
2.2 Signature Phase
In the signature phase, Alice signs her message |P 〉 and obtains her signature |S〉.
Step1: At the beginning, Alice prepares a string of message qubits |P 〉 = {|p1〉, |p2〉, · · · , |pn〉}, where
any qubit |pi〉 (i = 1, 2 · · · , n) in |P 〉 is one of the two eigenstates |0〉, |1〉. |P 〉may be presented by classical
bits. We represent the message string as qubits so that the signature can be transmitted through quantum
channel.
Step2: In this step, Alice transforms the massage qubits |P 〉 into state |M〉 according to A. If Ai = 0,
Alice does nothing to |pi〉, otherwise she applies bit flip gate
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
to |pi〉. Then after Alice’s qubit operations, she obtains
|M〉 = {|m1〉, |m2〉, · · · , |mn〉} = {|A1 ⊕ p1〉, |A2 ⊕ p2〉, · · · , |An ⊕ pn〉}.
Step3: In this step, Alice transforms the massage qubits |P 〉 into state |R〉 according to Ka. If K
i
a = 0,
Alice uses rectilinear measurement basis {| →〉, | ↑〉}. If Ki
a
= 1, Alice uses diagonal measurement basis
{| ր〉, | ց〉}. Then |0〉, |1〉 of the message qubits |P 〉 are represented by | →〉 and | ↑〉 in the rectilinear
measurement basis and by | ր〉 and | ց〉 in the diagonal measurement basis, respectively. Alice obtains
|R〉 =MKa |P 〉 = {|r1〉, |r2〉, · · · , |rn〉},
where |ri〉 =M
i
Ka
|pi〉(i = 1, 2, · · · , n).
Step4: Alice obtains the quantum signature |S〉 for the message qubits |P 〉 by encrypting |M〉 and
the secret qubits |R〉 with the key Ka.
|S〉 = EKa{|M〉, |R〉}.
Step5: Alice sends the signature |S〉 to Bob through a quantum channel.
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2.3 Verification phase
In the verification phase, Bob verifies Alice’s signature |S〉 with the help of the arbitrator.
Step1: After receiving the signature |S〉, Bob encrypts |S〉 and B with the key Kb and obtains
|N〉 = EKb{|S〉, B}.
Then he sends |N〉 to the arbitrator.
Step2: The arbitrator decrypts |N〉 with the key Kb and obtains |S〉, B
′. Then he decrypts |S〉 with
the key Ka and obtains |M〉, |R〉.
Step3: The arbitrator recovers the message |P 〉 with |M〉 and A for
|P 〉 = |A⊕M〉 = {|A1 ⊕m1〉, |A2 ⊕m2〉, · · · , |An ⊕mn〉}.
The arbitrator then generates |R′
a
〉 using |P 〉 and Ka according to the methods of the third step in
the signature phase. He compares |R′a〉 with |R〉 and generates a verification parameter γ. If |R
′
a〉 = |R〉,
he sets γ = 0, otherwise γ = 1. The arbitrator also compares B′ with B and generates parameter ξ. If
B′ = B, he sets ξ = 0, otherwise ξ = 1. The arbitrator transforms the message qubits |P 〉 into |R′
b
〉,
where |R′
b
〉 =MKb|P 〉, using Kb. He also generates |U〉 = |B ⊕ P 〉 using B and |P 〉.
Step4: The arbitrator encrypts γ, ξ, |U〉, |R′
b
〉 and |S〉 using the key Kb and obtains
|V 〉 = EKb{γ, ξ, |U〉, |R
′
b
〉, |S〉}.
Then he sends |V 〉 to Bob.
Step5: Bob decrypts |V 〉 and obtains γ, ξ, |U〉, |R′
b
〉, |S〉. If γ = ξ = 0, he then recovers the message
qubits by |P 〉 = |B ⊕ U〉. Bob generates |R′〉 using |P 〉 and Kb, and compares it with |R
′
b
〉. If |R′〉 = |R′
b
〉,
he accepts the message qubits |P 〉 and the signature |S〉, otherwise he should reject it.
3 Security analysis
The security of signature schemes requires that the signatory can not disavow her signature and the
signature can not be forged. We demonstrate that our scheme is unconditionally secure as follows.
3.1 Impossibility of forgery
Theorem 1. If other entities forge Alice’s signature, their cheating will be detected with a probability
Pr ≥ 1−
1
2|Ka|+|A|
.
Proof. The signature is generated by encrypting the state |R〉 and |M〉 with Ka, secretly kept by
Alice and the arbitrator. Ka is distributed via QKD protocol proved as unconditionally secure. |R〉,
|M〉 are states, into which Alice transforms the message qubits |P 〉 according to Ka and A, respectively.
Firstly, we assume that Bob is dishonest and tries to forge Alice’s signature. However, |R〉, |M〉 and
Ka are secret for him. Secondly, we assume an attacker, Eve tries to forge Alice’s signature. The
public parameters of our scheme are |S〉, |N〉 and |V 〉, where |S〉 = EKa{|M〉, |R〉}, |N〉 = EKb{|S〉, B},
|V 〉 = EKB{γ, ξ, |U〉, |R
′
b
〉, |S〉} and they do not offer any information of the secret keys. The encryption
algorithm is quantum one-time pad proved as unconditionally secure. If Bob or Eve randomly selects the
two strings K ′
a
and A′ to execute the scheme, their cheating will be detected by the arbitrator with a
probability lager than 1− 1
2|Ka|+|A|
, where |Ka| and |A| denote the length of the Ka and A, respectively.
3.2 Impossibility of disavowal
Theorem 2.If Alice denies her signature, the arbitrator can judge whether Alice has disavowed her
signature.
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Proof. Because the signature |S〉 contains Alice’s key Ka, Alice can not disavow her signature. If
Alice disavows her signature, Bob only need to send the signature |S〉 to the arbitrator and the arbitrator
will judge whether Alice has disavowed her signature. If the signature contains Alice’s secret keys, this
signature has been carried by Alice, otherwise, the signature has been forged by other entities. On the
other hand, Bob can not deny his receiving of Alice’s signature because he needs the help of the arbitrator
in the verification phase.
4 Efficiency analysis
We simply define the efficiency of quantum signature schemes as the formula η = Bs/(Qt+Bt), where Bs
is the number of message qubits signed, Qt and Bt are each the number of qubit transmitted and classical
bit exchanged in the scheme. In terms of the formula, the efficiency of our scheme, Lee’s scheme and
Zeng’s scheme is each 11%, 11% and 9%. However, the formula is just used to simply analyze the efficiency
of quantum signature schemes. In practice, we should also consider the complexity of realizing a scheme,
involving the distribution of initial secret information, measurement methods, encryption algorithm, etc.
Although an arbitrator is not necessary in Gottesman’s scheme, it requires a trusted key distribution
center, which has authenticated links to all three participators. Moreover,M keys are used to sign each bit
message in Gottesman’s scheme. Zeng’s scheme requires a joint measurement on each message qubit and
GHZ particle to generate a four-particle entangled state and n Bell measurement to disentangle message
qubits and GHZ particles. In Lee’s scheme, the signatory and the verifier should also measure their GHZ
particles and compare qubits strings in the verification phase. Lu¨’s scheme is relatively complicated,
because the secret keys and the syndromes of quantum stabilizer codes are each used to encrypt and
encode the quantum states. Our scheme does not need to use the GHZ triplet states, so it reduces the
process of distributing and measuring the GHZ particles. In the verification phase, we only need to
use von Neumann measurement to verify the qubits strings. Compared with these quantum signature
schemes, our scheme provides higher efficiency.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a quantum signature scheme with single photons. In the initial phase of our
scheme, secret keys and authentication keys are distributed to each participator via QKD protocol. In
the signature phase, Alice generates her signature by encrypting the transformed message qubits with
the secret keys. In the verification phase, Bob verifies Alice’s signature with the help of the arbitrator.
The security analysis showed that our scheme is unconditionally secure. We only need to utilize QKD,
quantum one-time pad, qubit operations and von Neumann measurement to realize our scheme, so the
scheme is simple and practicable. Many potential improvements of quantum signature remain largely
unexplored. The properties of quantum should be fully used to design more practicable quantum signature
schemes.
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